Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2005

Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of
Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience
Jane C. Ginsburg
Columbia Law School, jane.ginsburg@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship:
International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 11 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1377

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of
Authorship:
International Obligations and the US Experience
Jane C. Ginsburg*

INTRODUCTION
The ongoing (belated) transposition of the EU Information Society Directive's
requirement that member States adopt legal prohibitions on the circumvention of
technological protections of works of authorship' has made this topic both current
and contentious. This article wades into that rhetorically-charged fray in two
different, but, I hope, analytically rigorous, ways. First, following some general
observations concerning the impetus for copyright-holder resort to technological
protection measures, I will consider the scope of international obligations the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaties (WCT)
impose on member States to protect against circumvention. Second, I will address
the US experience with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA's)
prohibitions on circumvention of access and copy controls. I will consider the text
of the statute, codified at section 1201 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the five years of
judicial decisions interpreting the statute, and the two administrative proceedings
implementing one aspect of the statutory scheme. The analysis of the DMCA and
its judicial and administrative interpretation will take up three issues:
1) What technological measures does section 1201 protect?
2) What conduct does section 1201 prohibit?
3) To what extent does section 1201 accommodate copyright exceptions?
By examining one national system where legal protections for technological

Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School
of law; visiting Goodhart Chair of Legal Science, University of Cambridge. This article is based on a
lecture given at the University of Oslo Faculty of Law, May 18, 2005; Part I is based in part on SAM
RICKETSON AND JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE

BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (forthcoming Oxford U. Press 2006).
1. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L
167) 10-19 [hereinafter Information Society Directive]. Article 6 addresses technological protection
measures; article 13(1) required member States to have implemented the Directive's norms by Dec 22,
2002.
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measures have been in place for some time, I hope to contribute modestly toward
the discussions in Europe concerning the implementation of the EU and WIPO
Treaties' directive to provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of
effective technological measures. 2 The US experience to date indicates that legal
protection for technological measures has helped foster new business models that
make works available to the public at a variety of price points and enjoyment
options, without engendering the "digital lockup" and other copyright owner abuses
that many had feared. 3 This is not to say that the US legislation and its judicial
interpretation have found the magic formula for making the Internet a hospitable
place for authors while continuing to enable lawful user conduct. But brooding
forecasts and legitimate continuing concerns notwithstanding, the overall
equilibrium so far appears to be a reasonable one.
Let me turn to the general policy question: Why establish an international
obligation requiring legal protection for technological protections of copyrighted
works? As many commentators and other authorities have recognized, in the
digital environment, the ease of copying may render legal protection simpliciter
inadequate. 4 In the past, copying technology was too rudimentary, cumbersome or
expensive to enable users to copy and redisseminate on the scale that digital media
makes possible.5 Copyright law's prohibitions thus generally sufficed because
right holders could enforce the law against the commercial intermediaries who
engaged in large scale copying and dissemination, while whatever copying end
users engaged in was unlikely to rival the copyright owner's control of markets for
the work. When digital media changed the technological balance, they also altered
legal relationships, for now economically significant infringing acts were no longer
the sole province of entities higher up the distribution chain. To redress the shift, it

2. See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 84 (1997) [hereinafter WCT];
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997) [hereinafter
WPPT]; Information Society Directive, supranote 1, art. 6.
3. On fear and loathing of legal protection for technological measures, see, e.g., Jonathan Band &
Taro lsshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provision in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step,
CYBERSPACE LAW, Feb. 1999, at 2; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999);
Jessica Litman, The Breadth of the Anti-Trafficking Provisions and the Moral High Ground, in
ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS JUNE 13-17,
2001 456 (Jane C. Ginsburg & June M. Besek eds., 2002) [hereinafter ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES];
Kamiel Koelman, The Protection of Technological Measures vs. the Copyright Limitations, in
ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES at 448; Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of Technical Protection

Systems: Will There Still Be Room for Copyright?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 431 (1996).
4.
See, e.g., US Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the Task Force on the National
Information Infrastructure, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 230 (1995); JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996,
135-37 (2002); MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO
TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, 359-406 (2002); SEVERINE DUSOLLIER,
DROIT D'AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L'UNIVERS NUMtRIQUE - DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS
A LA LUMIERE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES OEUVRES 35-102 (2005).

5. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217, 224-25 (discussing "state of the art" limitations on unauthorized copying and exploitation).
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might be necessary to reinforce the legal prohibition with a layer of technological
protection, disabling end users from availing themselves of some of the copying
technology's potential for reproducing and redistributing copyrighted works.
But supplying a technological lock may offer only short-lived solace: the
measure may be effective only for so long as it takes to develop and distribute a
device to break it. If end users may easily procure the means to circumvent
technological impediments, then we are back where we started, without a
middleman against whom copyright may effectively be enforced. Hence the
conclusion followed that legal protection supplemented by technological protection
will fail unless the technological protection is in turn backed up by further legal
protection against the provision of circumvention devices or services. 6 When the
copyists are so diffuse, the intermediary whom the enforcement efforts target now
becomes the distributor of the means to circumvent technological protections.
The mandates of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties stem from this recognition.
Moreover, the drafters of the WCT and WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT) were not writing on an entirely clean slate, for WIPO had itself
previously considered proposing dispositions prohibiting the distribution of
"unauthorized decoders" of encrypted television transmissions. 7 In addition, the
European Commission had in 1991 already required member States to prohibit
"any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for commercial purposes of,
any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate the unauthorized
removal or circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to
protect a computer program." 8 Similarly, in 1992, the US Audio Home Recording
Act required all "digital audio recording device[s]" to be equipped with the "Serial
Copy Management System," which disabled multigenerational copying of digital
musical recordings. The Act also prohibited the distribution of any device or
provision of any service "the primary purpose or effect of which is to...
circumvent" the system. 9 More generally, many national laws contained a variety
6.

For an evocation and analysis of this three-layer approach, see, e.g., Alain Strowel., La

protection des mesures techniques:

une couche en trop?, AUTEURS & MtDIAS, 2001, at 90-95;

DUSOLLIER, supra note 4. As Professor Sirinelli has observed, "Technology comes to the aid of rights
threatened by technology. But can it do everything? In order to be really effective, the devices
themselves have to be protected. The WIPO Treaties ...provide such measures. In a never-ending
game of mirrors, rights come to the aid of technology so as to allow the latter to come to the aid of
rights ....H!"

Pierre Sirinelli, Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty

(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms (WPPT), Geneva, Switz., Dec. 6-7, 1999,
Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright and NeighboringRights, 28, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/I

(Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Implementation Workshop], available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/
en/meetings/1999/wct-wppt/pdf/imp99_ .pdf.
7.
See Preparatory Document, Committee of Experts on Model Provisions in the Field of
Copyright, Third Session (Geneva, July 2-13, 1990), 26 COPYRIGHT 9, 241, 280, paras. 319-38 (1990)

[hereinafter Committee of Experts on Model Provisions]. The Committee of Experts also considered
requiring the provision of equipment that would limit the ability of home recording machines to make
successive generations of digital copies. See id. paras. 303-17. The proposal would have included an
early form of copyright management information. See id. para. 312.
8.
Directive 91/250/EEC of the Council of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer
programs, art. 7(l)(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42-46.
9.
17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1998).
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of provisions in their tort or unfair competition laws as well as in their
telecommunication and penal laws, prohibiting a range of circumvention-related
0
conduct such as the sale of satellite descramblers and computer hacking.'
I.

SUBJECT MATTER AND SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATION

Article 11 of the WCT provides:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used
by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this treaty or the Berne
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of
11 their works, which are not authorized
by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
We will consider the subject matter as well as the scope of protection that the
WCT requires member States to provide.12
Subject matter protected-"effective technological measures": The WCT
does not define what makes a technological protection measure "effective." The
term, which recurs in national and regional laws implementing art. 11,13 is not selfexplanatory. 14 The one thing it cannot mean is "impervious." That is, were the
measure not "effective" unless it resisted attempts to circumvent it, there would be
no need for legal protection; the technology would take care of itself. If "effective"
simply means that it hinders or prevents the relevant copyright-implicating act 15
copying, distributing, communicating to the public-then it is not clear what the
term adds. 16 By contrast, the approach taken in the European Union defines the

10. For a detailed discussion, see Severine Dusollier, General Report, Situating Legal Protections
for Copyright-Related Technological Measures in the Broader Legal Landscape: Anti Circumvention
Protection Outside Copyright, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 3, at 123. See also the
questionnaire related to the GeneralReport. Id. at 110.
11. WCT, supra note 2.
12. The following analysis of WCT art. 11 is adapted from SAM RICKETSON & JANE C.
GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND

BEYOND (forthcoming, Oxford U. Press 2006).
13. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A), 1201(b)(l)(A) (2000); Information Society Directive,
supra note 1.
14. For a variety of interpretations, see Jacques de Werra, The Legal System of Technological
Protection Measures under the WIPO Treaties, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the European

Union Directives, and other National Laws, (Japan, Australia), in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES
198, 207 (2002).
15. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2)(B) (2000) ("a technological measure 'effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation,
prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title").
16.
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 4, at 145, suggest that malfunctioning technological
measures need not be protected against circumvention, nor should those which "interfere with the
normal functioning of the equipment or services," giving the example of a copy control mechanism that
interferes with the playability of a television or VCR.
Perhaps a technological measure is not "effective," even if it functions properly, if access may
be gained by means other than circumventing the device, that is, if the access device controls one "door"
to a work, but another "door" exists and is not technologically locked, then locking only one "door" is

2005]
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term to describe the universe of protected measures: in the EU, an "effective"
technological measure is one "where the use of a protected work or other subjectmatter is controlled by the rightholders through application of an access control or
protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the
work or other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, which achieves the
protection objective."'1 7 This definition resolves the question of coverage of types
of technological measures. It implies, however, that a technological measure that
well it
controls neither access nor copying would not be "effective" (no matter how
18
functioned) and therefore would not be protected against circumvention.
"Used by authors.. .": In this context, the term "authors" comprehends
authors' successors in title 19 (see Berne. Conv. art. 2(6)). While authors themselves
may increasingly apply technological protection measures that enable them to
market their works directly to the public without resort to intermediaries who
require them to transfer all or part of their copyrights, 20 the WCT text should not be
read to limit the protection of technological measures only to those actually applied
by authors. Such a reading would disqualify protection of devices used by
intermediaries on behalf of authors, thus defeating the WCT's author-protective
goals. Moreover, the difficulty of knowing whether a particular protection measure
has been used by the author or by her successor in title would make such an
interpretation unworkable.
"lIn connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Berne Convention": This phrase concerns the types of technological protection
measures covered. A measure that prevents or hinders any of the acts covered
within Berne or WCT economic or moral rights with respect to protected works
would come within art. 1 's scope. Thus, measures protecting against copying,21
adapting, 22 distributing of physical copies, including by means of rental, 23 publicly

not "effective." See Lexmark Int'l. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir, 2004)
(employing door metaphor). See discussion infra Part II.
17. Information Society Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
18.
It is not clear that such a measure in fact does or will exist. Devices that control distribution
come to mind, but in the digital environment, distribution (or making available) probably implies
copying. For the same reasons, technological measures protecting the moral right of integrity will
probably be covered by the EU's definition of "effective." By contrast, a technological measure that
protects the attribution right might not. Moreover such a device would not necessarily be within the
scope of WCT art. 12's protection for copyright management information.
19. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2., sec. 6, July 24,
1971, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 [hereinafter Berne Conv.].
20. In the digital environment, many of the tasks publishers performed that were unrelated to the
production and distribution of hard copies, such as promoting the works and accounting for sales, may
be undertaken by agents or other new businesses whose compensation need not derive from owning the
author's copyrights. See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1645-47 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 274-275 (2002).
21. Berne Conv., supra note 19, art 9.
22. Berne Conv., supranote 19, art. 12.
23. WCT, supra note 2, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 82.
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25
communicating 24 and against violations of the integrity and attribution rights
would all be covered.
But a particularly significant subset of technological protection measures
26
addresses an arguably different act; these regulate access to a work of authorship.
In the digital environment, works may be made available not only in traditional
formats permitting unlimited access but also in access-controlled formats that limit
the user's apprehension of the work to a certain number of viewings or hearings, or
to a certain time period. A technological measure shuts off access after the
designated time period or number of consultations. The copy of the work may
remain in the user's hard drive or on a CD-ROM or similar external medium, but
the user may be required to pay an additional fee or supply additional information
before access will be restored. These sorts of formats may be particularly
appealing to users who do not need or desire unlimited viewings or hearings of the
work, assuming that a reduction in price accompanies the reduction in access.
Whatever the business justifications for access controls, the question for
interpretation of WCT art. 11 is whether it prohibits the circumvention of these
measures as well.
Coverage of access controls: The response turns on whether access controls
are "used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under the Treaty
or the Berne Convention." We will consider, first, whether accessing a work
comes within the Berne-WCT minimum rights. Next, we will address whether
access controls are "used ... in connection with" the exercise of those rights. In
connection with the first question, it is important to distinguish accessing a work
from accessing a copy of a work, as access controls generally apply to the former.
Suppose a user purchases a CD-ROM containing a copyrighted work, such as a
videogame. She has acquired a copy, the physical medium in which the work is
embodied. But the medium is not the work. The work is the videogame; to access
this, she needs to load the game into her computer or videogame player; when the
game's sounds are heard and the images appear on the screen, she will have
accessed the work. If a technological measure included on the CD-ROM does not
permit her to play her copy of the game unless, for example, she enters a password
or plays the game only on certain designated computers, that is a measure

24. Berne Conv., supra note 19, arts. 11, 1Ibis, liter, 14, 14bis; WCT, supra note 2, art. 8, 36
I.L.M. at 83.
25. Berne Cony., supra note 19, art. 6bis.
26. For a description and analysis of technological protection measures, see, e.g., June Besek,
Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report From the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and

the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389, 446-66 (2004) [hereinafter, Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws];
Jeffrey Cunard, Technological Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright Management Systems:
A Brief Survey of the Landscape, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 3, at 24; Jacques de
Werra, supra note 13, at 200-205; Gillian Davies, Technical Devices as a Solution to Private Copying,
in COPYRIGHT IN THE NEW DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, 163, 173-178 (Irini Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans
eds., 2000); Dean Marks and Bruce Tumbull, Implementation Workshop, supra note 6, Technical
Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, WIPO Doc.

WCT-WPPT/IMP/3,
available
wct-wppt/pdf/ imp99_3.pdf

at

http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/
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controlling access to the work.
In light of this distinction, can it be said that the Berne Convention or WCT
establishes a right to control access to a work? The WCT introduces a right of
distribution of copies to the public, but this right addresses material (rather than
electronic) copies; it would not extend beyond conferring a right to control access
to a physical copy, rather than to a work.27 The WCT also synthesizes the Berne
Convention's various provisions on public performance into a general right of
"communication to the public," including by digital delivery. 28 This right would
appear to cover "access" to a work through online media; it is considerably less
clear that it would also cover subsequent apprehension of a work once the user
downloads a copy to the user's storage medium, or once the user acquires a freestanding copy, such as a CD-ROM. 29 The subsequent acts may "perform" or
"communicate" the works, but not in or to the public. Neither the Berne
Convention nor the WCT requires member States to extend exclusive rights to
private performances or communications.
Accessing a work expressed in digital form might nonetheless implicate the
reproduction right under the Berne Convention: each apprehension of the work
implies the creation of a temporary copy in the user's RAM. The reproduction
right set out at Berne Conv. art. 9(1) extends to "any manner or form;" thus, it may
well cover temporary digital copies of this kind. But the scope of the reproduction
ight proved sufficiently controversial at the Diplomatic Conference that produced
the WCT, so that many signatories to the WCT may not subscribe to a
characterization of the scope of the reproduction right that would embrace a right of
access to a work.
Given the continuing uncertainty in some quarters regarding the scope of the
reproduction right, does it follow that WCT member States are not obliged to
protect access controls against circumvention? Not necessarily, because one must
next ask whether access controls are technological measures "used in connection
with the exercise" of exclusive rights. Here the case for WCT coverage appears
stronger. For example, access controls may be said to be used in connection with
the exercise of the reproduction and communication rights because an accesscontrolled copy, even if reproduced or communicated without authorization, will
yield its copyist or recipient no benefits; that person will not be able to apprehend
the work. 30 Thus, access controls underpin the reproduction, communication and

27. WCT, supra note 2, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 82, and accompanying Agreed Statement.
28. See id. art. 8 ("[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access those
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.") (emphasis added).
29. Article 6 of the 2001 Information Society Directive, however, implements WCT art. 11 by
protecting access controls. Supra note 1.
30. See Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't v. Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157. In an action
under section 116A of the Australian copyright act, which gives copyright owners a right of action
against sellers of devices whose purpose is to circumvent technological protection measures, the court
construed "technological protection measure" to include controls that block access to unauthorized
copies because the controls "prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work." Id. at [11]. A
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distribution rights.
Acts prohibited - "the circumvention": The WCT text appears most directly
to cover the acts of removing, breaking or bypassing a technological measure. But
relatively few individual users are likely to be able to engage in these acts unaided
by a device that will overcome the protection. The question therefore arises
whether the formulation "the circumvention" covers only that act or also reaches
the more economically significant activity of "preparatory acts," including
supplying a device that will enable the circumvention. The earlier version of art. 11
set out in the Basic Proposal 3' specifically targeted circumvention devices; should
one infer from the final version's more abstract expression a rejection of the
liability of manufacturers and distributors of devices? 32
Such an inference seems unwarranted, because it would significantly diminish
the effectiveness of the prohibition. First, limiting the prohibition to the act of
circumvention would mean that copyright owners would need to discover and
prove the commission of acts that may often occur in private, at the user's home.
This seems both difficult for copyright owners and undesirable to users.33 Second,
outlawing the device as well as the activity is likely to have a greater impact on the
provision of circumvention devices; without the device, less circumvention is likely
to occur, and it is more effective to pursue a small number of device suppliers than
the large numbers of their customers. 34 Moreover, the formulation "the
circumvention" should be read in the context of the sentence in which it appears.
An interpretation that disfavors effective protection against circumvention by
limiting the prohibited conduct to the sole act of circumvention, rather than
encompassing the provision of devices as well, would be inconsistent with art. I l's
direction that member States "shall provide adequate legal protection and effective
legal remedies against the circumvention..."35

technological measure that "renders the infringing copies... useless," meets the statutory requirement
of preventing infringement "by rendering the sale of the copy 'impracticable or impossible by

anticipatory action."' Id. at [20].
This decision also exemplifies the uncertainty regarding the relationship of RAM copying to

the reproduction right; two of the three judges held that temporary storage in RAM did not produce a
copy "in material form," and therefore no reproduction within the meaning of the Act had occurred. Id.
at [147].
31. Basic Proposalfor the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, 217,
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (1996) [hereinafter Basic Proposal].
32. See, e.g., Thomas C. Vijne, Copyright Imperilled? 21 E.I.P.R. 192, 201 (1999); Alain Strowel
and S6verine Dusollier, Implementation Workshop, supra note 6, Legal Protection of Technological
Systems, 7, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/2, available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/

1999/wct-wppt/pdf/imp99_2.pdf. But see, Kamiel Koelman, A Hard Nut to Crack: The Protection of
Technological Measures, 22 EIPR 272, 273 (2000) ("Whether the WCT actually requires the targeting

of the act of circumventing a technological measure is debatable.").
33. See, e.g., Marks & Turnbull, supra, note 26, at 6 (pointing out privacy and practical concerns
underlying the monitoring of private activity that a prohibition limited to the act of circumvention would
entail).
34. See Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra note 4, at 144.
35. See id. at 145; Ficsor, supranote 4, at 549.
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Acts prohibited--circumvention of technological measures "that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law": Not all acts of circumvention are violations of
article 11; member States incur no obligation to prohibit circumventions that allow
the user to exploit a public domain work or to engage in an act authorized by the
right holder, or, more importantly, that allow the user to engage in a non-infringing
act, such as accessing a work in the public domain, or copying for purposes
endorsed by articles 10 and l0bis. Article 11 delegates to member States' laws the
determination of permissible acts, but these must remain consonant with the scope
of exceptions and limitations allowed under WCT art. 10 and Berne Conv. arts.
9(2), 10, 1Obis, 1Ibis and 13.
The difficulty in implementing WCT article 11 arises with respect to the
prohibition of circumvention devices and services. These may be used to engage in
acts that infringe, but they may also be used for permitted purposes. If the
prohibition sweeps too broadly, it may bar the manufacture and dissemination of
devices or services that have legitimate uses other than to circumvent controls on
access to copyrighted works. Too extensive a prohibition may frustrate whatever
legitimate activities the devices may permit. Equally importantly, too broad a
prohibition may hamper the development of useful new technologies. On the other
hand, if national law provided that a device may be distributed so long as it is
capable of being put to use for non-infringing purposes, the prohibition would
likely become meaningless. This in turn would put the national law in tension with
article 11, for that law's protection of the technological measure would be neither
"adequate" nor "effective."
For example, an access-circumvention device may be used to decrypt publicdomain motion pictures, but the same device can be employed to decrypt works
still under copyright. A device that circumvents copy controls may be used to copy
limited portions for purposes of illustration for teaching, but it may also be used to
make unlimited complete copies to distribute to one's friends (or to the world over
the Internet) for purposes of personal enjoyment. In most instances, and especially
for mass-market devices, the maker or provider of the device will not know, at the
time the device is made available, the nature of the use to which it will be put
(although he or she might well anticipate that the market for the device is not likely
to be limited to researchers, teachers and librarians). 36 Even if the device is
designed in good faith to allow the public to decrypt DVDs of "The Sheik" or
"Birth of a Nation" or other silent-era motion pictures in the public domain, it is
equally capable, and probably more likely, to be used to unlock the digitized oeuvre
of Federico Fellini or Woody Allen.

36. The context of the production or provision of the device may be determinative in certain
circumstances.
For example, if a university's information technology department supplies a
circumvention device to university teaching or library staff for purposes of research or preservation, the
uses of the device will likely be limited to those "permitted by law," and the provision of the device
should therefore be permissible as well. Problems would arise, however, were the same device
distributed to the general public, because the activities of the recipients of the device would no longer be
likely to be confined to non infringing acts.
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The Basic Proposal sought to address the problem of intended purpose or likely
utilization by defining the prohibited device as one whose "primary purpose or
effect" was to circumvent. 37 This drew considerable opposition, however, notably
from delegations who urged a "sole purpose or effect" standard. 38 The final
version of article 11 avoids that controversy by declining to define targeted devices
(indeed, not mentioning devices at all), and leaving it to member States to
determine how to protect against "the circumvention..." As the analysis above
suggests, however, the "adequate and effective" proviso would seem to require
member States to bar the general circulation of circumvention devices. For the
same reason, it also appears to disallow a "sole intended purpose" standard. While
that standard might have proved too coarse a sieve, the opposite risk remains that,
in the absence of treaty guidance on the preservation of non-infringing uses,
national implementing laws will design so fine a mesh that too few non-infringing
applications will succeed in passing through. The challenge for national laws, then,
is to determine how to regulate the creation and dissemination of circumvention
devices without effectively cutting off the fair uses that at least some devices, in the
right hands, would permit.
"Effective legal remedies": WCT Article 11 does not instruct member States
regarding the nature of the sanction for violating the anti circumvention norm.
Thus, the WCT does not specify whether member States must grant injunctive
relief against the distribution of circumvention devices or offering of circumvention
services. In many cases, that relief may be necessary to insure "adequate and
effective" protection, but there may be situations in which a lesser course, such as
permitting the distribution of the device, subject to remunerating right owners,
might be envisioned. As a general matter, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) provisions on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights indicate the range of remedies that constitute effective relief. 39 It is worth
noting that the WCT does not require that protections for technological measures
be enacted as part of national copyright laws; that certainly is one route, but so too
the scope of more general
are sui generis laws or inclusion of protections within
40
laws, such as those addressing unfair competition.
One matter, discussed in connection with the Basic Proposal, was whether
member States should be obliged to impose design mandates on consumer
equipment so that mass market playback devices would interact successfully with

37. Supra note 31, at 711-14.
38. Proposed amendment to substitute "sole intended purpose" for "primary purpose or effect"
(submitted by Singapore). Id. at 712, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/12.
39. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 41-61, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1213-20 (1994).

40. For example, Japan has divided coverage of technological measures between the copyright
law and the unfair competition law. Copyright Law, Law No.48 of 1970, art. 120bis(i) (amended 1988);
Unfair Competition Prevention Law, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2(x)-(xi) (amended 1999), discussed in
Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, supra note 26, at 431-36. Australia has done this solely within the
provisions of its 1968 Copyright Act but makes them the subject of separate rights of action that may be
brought by the copyright owner. Copyright Act, 1968, sects. I 16A, D.
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technological protection measures applied to the content of the works played back.
Mandates of this sort had been posited and debated as early as the WIPO Draft
Model Law of 1990.41 But those debates occurred in the context of discussions
over mandated protection measures, such as the Serial Copy Management System
ultimately required for digital audio tape players by the 1992 US Audio Home
Recording Act. 42 Once the drafters determined to leave the design of protection
measures to the member States, design mandates were no longer at issue at the
international level. Member States remain free to impose such requirements as a
means of domestic implementation of the anti-circumvention norm, but they have
no duty to do so. The trend, in fact, is the other way: both the US and the EU have
explicitly exempted the designers of playback or other devices from having to
comply with the specifications of the protection measure, so long as they do not
circumvent it.4 3 Non-cooperation is fully permissible; aggressive hostilities are not.
We have considered the policy underlying WCT article 11; does the WCT
successfully implement that policy? If the goal was to promote the digital
distribution of works of authorship by giving authors some sense of security that
copy or access-protected formats will not be vulnerable to piracy, it remains to be
seen how effective national implementations of article 11 prove to be in preventing
or forestalling circumvention 44 activities or devices. If the companion goal was to
ensure that privileged unauthorized uses could continue to be made
notwithstanding authors' resort to technological protections, it remains to be seen
whether the various member State attempts to reconcile meaningful protection with
preservation of copyright exceptions and limitations achieve a successful balance.
With that caution in mind, we turn to the US experience in implementing the
mandates of the WIPO Treaties.
H. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH LEGAL PROTECTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP
The following discussion will examine the text of Section 1201 of the 1976
Copyright Act and its judicial and administrative interpretation. 45 The text defines

41. See Memorandum, Committee of Experts on Model Provisions, supra note 7, at 279, paras.
312-18 [hereinafter Memorandum]; Report, Committee of Experts on Model Provisions,supra note 7, at
299, paras. 159-67 [hereinafter Report].
42. See Memorandum, supra note 41, paras. 309-10; Report, supra note 41, para. 164; 17 USC §
1002 (1992).
43. See 17 USC § 1201(c) (2000) ("no mandate" clause); Information Society Directive, supra
note 1, Recital 48.
44. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §. 1201(d)-(j) (2000); Information Society Directive, supra note 1, art.
6(4), para. 43.
45. Section 1201 provides, in relevant part:
§ 1201. Circumventionofcopyrightprotectionsystems
(a) ViolationsRegarding Circumvention of TechnologicalMeasures.
(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title. The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence shall take
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three new violations: (a)(1) to circumvent technological protection measures that
control access to copyrighted works; (a)(2) to manufacture, disseminate or offer,
etc. devices or services, etc. that circumvent access controls and (b) to manufacture,
disseminate, or offer, etc. devices or services, etc. that circumvent a technological
measure that "effectively protects a right of the copyright owner.. . ." It is
important to appreciate that these violations are distinct from copyright
infringement. The violation occurs with the prohibited acts; it is not necessary to
prove that the dissemination of circumvention devices resulted in specific
infringements or that the purpose of circumventing an access control was to
commit an infringing act. On the other hand, section 1201 also sets out a long,

effect at the end of the 2-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this chapter....
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title.
(3) As used in this subsection(A) to "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt
an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and
(B) a technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the measure, in the
ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.
(b) Additional Violations. (1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a
work or a portion thereof;

(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof, or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.
(2) As used in this subsection(A) to "circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure" means avoiding, bypassing,
removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological measure; and

(B) a technological measure "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title" if
the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the
exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). For a discussion of the legislative history of Section 1201, and of proposals
that preceded it, see Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, note 26, at 400-07 (2004).
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disparate (and somewhat incoherent) list of exceptions to the prohibition on
circumvention of access controls. 46 Section 1201 thus appears to expand the scope
of copyright in the following ways:
1. It creates a claim for unauthorized access to works of authorship;
2. It makes distributors of circumvention devices directly liable for the
dissemination of the means to gain unauthorized access;
3. It makes distributors of circumvention devices directly liable for the
dissemination of the means to make copies or to engage in communications to the
public;
4. It makes disseminators of both kinds of devices liable even if some of the end
users to whom the devices are distributed would employ the devices for noninfringing purposes.
To appreciate the actual scope of section 1201, it is necessary to inquire further
into the subject matter of its protection, into the acts it prohibits and into its
accommodation of copyright exceptions. That inquiry will allow us better to assess
whether section 1201, at least as experienced so far, has over-expanded the reach of
copyright or, rather, has enabled copyright to adapt to the challenges and
opportunities that digital media present.
Subject matter protected: We have seen that section 1201 covers two
different kinds of protective measures, those that "effectively control access to a
work protected under this title [the Copyright Act]," and those that "effectively
protect a right of a copyright owner," i.e., that protect against copying and
communicating to the public. Judicial decisions construing section 1201 have
considered what it means to protect "effectively." They also have addressed
whether the object of the access control measure is a "work protected under this
title."
"Effectively protect:" With respect to the first issue, the courts are unanimous
that "effective" protection does not mean protection that is especially difficult to
crack. 47 For example, employing the door-and-key metaphor that judges
addressing access issues seem to favor, the court in 321 Studios v. MGM, a case
involving the sale of devices designed to permit "backup copying" of protected
DVDs, quipped that the claim that the DVD protection code is not "effective" "is
equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to find skeleton keys on the black market,
a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door. ' 4 8 The door metaphor reappeared in a
more serious challenge to the effectiveness of a "lockout code's" protection in

46.
17 USC § 1201(d)-() (2000).
47. 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also Universal
Studios v. Reimerdes, Ill F.Supp. 2d 346, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting as "spurious" the claim that DVD
protection code did not "effectively" protect DVDs because a Norwegian teenager easily cracked it).
48. 307 F.Supp. 2d at 1095. See also Pearl Indus. v. Standard 1/0, 275 F.Supp. 2d 326, 350 (D.
Me. 2003) (describing plaintiff's access control measure as "the 'electronic equivalent' of a locked
door").
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Lexmark v. Static Controls Corp., a decision concerning the circumvention of a
code controlling access to the functions of a printer. In that case, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals observed that the printer engine program was accessible by other
means.
The authentication sequence, it is true, may well block one form of "access" - the
"ability to... make use of' the Printer Engine Program by preventing the printer from
functioning. But it does not block another relevant form of "access" - the "ability to
[] obtain" a copy of the work or to "make use of" the literal elements of the program
(its code). Because the statute refers to "control[ling] access to a work protected
under this title," it does not naturally apply when the "work protected under this title"
is otherwise accessible. Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a
house "controls access" to a house whose front door does not contain a lock.., it
does not make sense to say that this provision of the DMCA applies to otherwisereadily-accessible copyrighted works. Add to this the fact that the DMCA not only
requires the technological measure to "control[] access" but also requires the measure
to control that access "effectively," and it seems clear that this provision does not
measure that restricts one form of access but leaves
naturally extend to a technological
49
another route wide open.
The significance of the court's interpretation depends on how many works will
come within the two elements of the described universe: one, works whose use
depends on interaction with a computer program that will function only upon
verification of an authentication sequence and, two, the code of this computer
50
program can be seen or copied without going through the authentication process.
Controlling access to a work of authorship: The Lexmark case is most
significant for its analysis of the second issue-whether the technological measure
controls access to a work protected under the Copyright Act. In notorious, but
happily short-lived, attempts to leverage the DMCA into protecting the
"aftermarket" for spare and replacement parts, the producers of printers and
cartridges, in one case, and of garage door openers, in the other, 51 asserted that rival
printer cartridge and door opener manufacturers had violated the DMCA's
prohibition on circumvention of access controls. In both cases, the spare part in
question would not interact with the host device unless the host device recognized
the spare part as authorized to function together with the host device. If the spare
49. Lexmark Int'l. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 at 547 (6th Cir. 2004). The
court also stated "one would not say that a lock on any door of a house 'controls access' to the house
after its purchaser receives the key to the lock." Id. This proposition is questionable: the lock continues
to control access to those who do not have keys.
50. There is a more radical, but less plausible, understanding of the court's characterization of
otherwise accessible: as discussed earlier, the "work" is an incorporeal object, thus, a work distributed
in digital copies which are access-protected, and in traditional hard copies which are not accessprotected, is "otherwise accessible" without circumventing the digital copies, because recourse may be
had to the hard copies. This would mean that section 1201(a) would apply only to technological
protections of works made available only in digital protected copies. It seems unlikely that Congress, in
seeking to encourage digital dissemination of works, also sought to discourage dissemination of the
same works in traditional non-protected formats. Indeed, such a construction could lead to the "digital
lockup" that many critics of the DMCA have feared.
51. Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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part entered the appropriate authentication sequence or, in the terms of another
frequently-used metaphor, engaged in the "secret handshake" with the host device,
then the host would be "fooled" into "thinking" that it was working with a
component made by the same producer and would allow the component to perform
its intended function. The "secret handshake" thus made it possible for a rival
printer cartridge to substitute for the printer producer's own replacement cartridges,
and for a "universal garage door opener" to open the remote controlled garage
doors installed by a rival company.
The question that should leap to mind is, "What have printer cartridges and
garage doors to do with copyright?" Nothing, except, emphasized the plaintiffs,
that computer programs control the functioning of these devices, and computer
programs are copyrighted works. The dazzling (or mind-boggling) consequence of
plaintiffs' reasoning is that any object whose workings are controlled by computer
programs-and today, that means an endless variety of consumer and industrial
goods-can come within the scope of section 1201 if the object's producer makes
access to those programs subject to an authentication sequence. As a policy matter,
this is inconceivable. Among other things, Congress has persistently declined to
legislate design protection, in part because of its inability to resolve the spare parts
issue; 52 it would be extraordinary if it achieved the result of an exceptionally strong
design protection regime through the stealthy means of the DMCA.
But does the text of section 1201 permit this result? The computer program that
controls the functioning of the consumer product may indeed be a copyrighted
work. The Lexmark court held that the authentication sequence was insufficiently
original to be protectable, but the printer program was copyrightable. Nonetheless,
that was not sufficient to bring the access control within the scope of section 1201.
In a common sense interpretation of the text, the court reviewed earlier "secret
handshake" cases, involving access to transmissions of recordings of musical
works, to videogames and to motion pictures on DVDs. The court underscored that
all involved circumvention of access to computer programs that were "conduit[s] to
protectable expression." 53 In the printer cartridge case, by contrast, invocation of
the computer program was clearly pretextual: operating the program did not make
it possible to see, hear or otherwise engage with a work of authorship. Rather, "the
program's output is purely functional: [it] 'controls a number of operations' in the
54
Lexmark printer."
Nature of the access that the measure controls: The court in the garage door
opener case reached the same result, but for different reasons. Where the Lexmark
court focused on the "work" that is the object of the access control, the
Chamberlain court addressed the purpose of the access that the technological
measure controls. The court interpolated into section 1201 a requirement that the
protection against circumvention of an access control be related to protection

52.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1301-1302 (2000), for the closest Congress has come, setting out asui generis
regime limited to the protection of boat hull designs.
53. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547-48.
54. Id. at 548.
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against infringement. To the extent that access controls forestall infringement, for
example, by making unauthorized copies unplayable and therefore futile, the access
control comes within the scope of section 1201. But, if the uses that the access
control cuts off are not infringing uses, then the access control is not one that
section 1201 was designed to protect, the court determined.55 In the case of garage
door openers, this makes some sense: using the opener does not infringe any
copyrights. But, as applied to access controls that are "conduits" to works of
authorship, the proposition is in some tension with Congress's goals in prohibiting
the circumvention of those technological measures. The Chamberlain court
worried that interpreting section 1201 to create an independent violation for
circumventing access controls (or disseminating access circumvention devices)
would "effectively create two distinct copyright regimes," one tied to the traditional
rights of copyright owners (section 1201(b)), and the other allowing copyright
owners "unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for
accessing that work, 56
even if that access enabled only rights that the Copyright Act
public."
the
to
grants
But there is considerable evidence from the text and from the legislative history
that Congress did intend to create an additional copyright regime, based on the
control over access to digitally distributed works of authorship. The text indicates
that the "access" that section 1201(a) protects goes beyond traditional copyright
prerogatives; it distinguishes "access" from a "right of the copyright owner under
this title." Some activities subject to access controls do not implicate traditional
copyright owner rights such as reproduction and public performance. For example,
an access control may limit the number of viewings of a motion picture distributed
on a DVD. But if the viewings occur at home, they likely do not come within the
traditional scope of exclusive rights. Thus, suppose I purchase a time-loaded or
limited-viewing DVD, for a lower price than an unlimited viewing DVD, and that I
circumvent an access protection in order to obtain unlimited number of private
viewings of the film for an unlimited time. I have not committed copyright
infringement, because the public performance right does not reach the extra
viewings. I have, however, defeated the purpose of offering the film on a pay-perview or similar basis. The legislative history indicates that the DMCA was
designed in part specifically to foster a variety of business models offering the
public a diversity of levels of access, for a diversity of prices. As the House
Commerce Committee reported:
[A]n increasing number of intellectual property works are being distributed using a
"client-server" model, where the work is effectively "borrowed" by the user (e.g.,
infrequent users of expensive software purchase a certain number of uses, or viewers

55. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1197-1201. The Federal Circuit reiterated this analysis in Storage
Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(circumvention of code controlling access to data library maintenance software held not to violate §
1201 because access does not "facilitate copyright infringement": copies made in RAM once software
is accessed are copies permitted under the § 117(c) exception for computer maintenance).
56. Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1200-01.
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watch a movie on a pay-per-view basis). To operate in this new environment, content
providers will need both the technology to make new uses
57 possible and the legal
framework to ensure they can protect their work from piracy.
"In other words," my Columbia colleague June Besek has explained, "providing
copyright owners with the ability to preclude unlimited access was a goal of the
DMCA, not just an unforeseen and unfortunate consequence." 58 This appears to be
true, even when some of the precluded access would not result in copyright
infringement.
Acts prohibited: Section 1201 prohibits the act of circumventing an access
control and the "trafficking" in devices that circumvent either access controls or
"rights" controls. It does not prohibit the act of circumventing a rights control, in
part because the results of that act will be directly infringing (or will qualify for an
exception), and in part because the most economically significant act is the
distribution of the device that will allow the end-user to circumvent. By contrast,
circumvention of an access control does not directly result in an infringement. If
circumvention of an access control is not unlawful, then, arguably, dissemination of
a device that enables circumvention of an access control would not be wrongful
either. By making the act of access circumvention unlawful, the DMCA lay a
stronger foundation for prohibiting the dissemination of enabling devices as well.
Circumvention: While most of the cases involve circumvention devices, a few
cases have arisen concerning the act of circumvention. 59 One of these put in issue
the meaning of "to circumvent." In IMS Inquiry Mgmt. Sys. v. Berkshire Info.
Mgmt. Sys., Berkshire accessed IMS's database by using a password apparently
obtained from one of the IMS's customers. 60 Berkshire defended against the
section 1201(a) claim on the ground that it did not break down the door of IMS's
database; it used an actual key. The court agreed: "Defendant did not surmount or
puncture or evade any technological measure to [gain access]; instead, it used a
password intentionally issued by plaintiff to another entity." 61 This interpretation is
questionable. Section 1201(a)(3)(A) defines "to circumvent" as "to descramble a
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner" (emphasis supplied). Entry of the password "deactivates" the
measure that restricts access; 62 if the password is employed by an unauthorized user,

57. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
58. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, supranote 26, at 474.
59. In one case, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the section
1201(a)(l) was unconstitutional because it restrained his First Amendment right to reverse engineer
software that blocked access to certain Internet sites in order to publish a list of the blocked sites. The
court held the complaint too vague to give rise to an adjudicable "case or controversy." Edelman v.
N2H2, 263 F.Supp. 2d 137 (D.Mass. 2003). In any event, it is likely plaintiff's conduct would have
benefited from statutory and administrative exceptions to sec. 1201 (a). See Besek, Anti-Circumvention
Laws, supra note 26, at 414-15.
60. 307 F.Supp. 2d 521 (SDNY 2003).
61. Id. at 533.
62. A password-controlled access measure fits the statutory definition of a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(3)(B) (2000).
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63
then the deactivation will not have occurred with the copyright owner's authority.
Devices: Section 1201(a)(2) and (b) do not prohibit the dissemination of every
device that might be used to defeat an access or rights control. These provisions do
not target general purpose devices whose accidental, incidental or unwitting use
results in circumvention. Nor does it bar those devices that, while capable of, and
even used for, circumvention, are primarily designed or used for other purposes.
The law prohibits the manufacture and trafficking in devices and services in the
following three circumstances:

1. The device was "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access" to a
copyrighted work or "effectively protects a right of the copyright owner"; or
2. The device, albeit not primarily designed to circumvent, in fact "has only
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent. . ."; or
3. The device is "marketed" (i.e., advertised or promoted) as a device to be used
to circumvent access or rights controls. In this case, the target of the law is the
person promoting the circumventing use; it is not the manufacturer or distributor of
the device, unless that person acts in concert with the marketer.
Many of the cases that have arisen have involved rather obvious circumvention
devices, such as cable and satellite descramblers, 64 and devices designed to
neutralize the access controls on DVDs.6 5 As a result, they have not required
courts to determine whether the primary purpose or actual use of the device was to
circumvent. 66 Courts have interpreted the text of section 1201 to reach trafficking
in circumvention devices regardless of whether the circumventions that the devices
enable would result in infringements. Thus, for example, in one of the DVD cases,
321 Studios v. MGM, the court stated the following:
[A] simple reading of the statute makes it clear that its prohibition applies to the
manufacturing, trafficking in and making of devices that would circumvent encryption
technology, not to the users of such technology. It is the technology itself at issue, not
the uses to which the copyrighted material may be put. This Court finds.., that legal

63. See. e.g., 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 2d 1085, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("321 states that
its software does not avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise impair a technological measure,
but that it simply uses the authorized key to unlock the encryption. However, while 321 's software does
use the authorized key to access the DVD, it does not have authority to use this key, as licensed DVD
players do, and it therefore avoids and bypasses [the] CSS [access control].").
64. See, e.g., DirecTV v. Borrow, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1328 (N.D. I11.2005); Comcast of Ill. v.
Hightech Electronics, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14619 (N.D. II1. 2004); DirectTV v. Ferguson, 328
F.Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
65. See, e.g., Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 321 Studios v. MGM, 307
F.Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
66. See DirecTV v. Little, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16350 (N.D. Cal. 2004), for an exception in
which the court determined that there was a factual dispute concerning whether the defendant's "smart
cards" were "primarily designed for signal theft."
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downstream use of the copyrighted material by customers is not 67a defense to the
software manufacturer's violation of the provisions of § 1201(b)(1).
In most of the cases, nonetheless, the relationship between the circumvention
that the device enabled and infringement was fairly apparent. For example, in one
of the first cases decided under section 1201, RealNetworks v. Streambox,68 the
defendant's device imitated the "secret handshake" giving access to recorded music
transmitted from the RealNetworks server. Unlike a Real Player, through which a
customer could listen to the transmissions, but not copy them, the defendant's
system ignored the Real server's "copy switch," enabling its customers to make
unauthorized copies of the recorded music. In 321 Studios v. MGM, the access
circumvention device allegedly allowed users to make playable "backup copies" of
DVDs that they had purchased, but there is no general copyright exception
permitting the creation of "backup copies." 69 Moreover, protestations that the
device simply facilitated lawful uses lost credibility in light of 321's "spam"
70
promotion of the device under the slogan, "Never buy another DVD again!"
Similarly, although the US distributors of the Norwegian-authored "De-CSS" DVD
access-circumvention program claimed the program could be used in a Linux-based
DVD player, the program was not distributed in the US as a component of such a
player; 71 rather, it was made available as a free-standing program that could be
used to neutralize the access protection on unauthorized copies of DVDs run on
Windows players. It doubtless did not assist defendants' cause to have published
the code in an online magazine called 2600.com, the Hacker Quarterly. As the
district court observed with some relish, "The Hacker Quarterly has included
articles on such topics as how to steal an Internet domain name, access other
people's e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer
72
systems at Costco stores and Federal Express."
A more debatable condemnation of an access-circumvention device occurred in
another early case, Sony Computer Ent. v. Gamemasters.73 Defendants sold a
"Game Enhancer" device that allowed users to alter the real-time play of a
videogame (without preserving the modifications) and that also allowed users to
override Sony's "region coding," so that a game purchased in a differently-coded
region, such as Europe or Japan, could nonetheless be played on a US PlayStation
console. Sony also claimed that the device that overrode the region-coding also
made it possible to play counterfeit copies of PlayStation games, but little evidence

67. 307 F.Supp. 2d at 1097-98 (citing Corley, 273 F.3d at 443; U.S. v. Elcom, 203 F.Supp. 2d
1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
68. RealNetworks v. Streambox,, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) permits archival copying of computer programs, but not every work
expressed in Is and Os is a "computer program." See Elcom, 203 F.Supp. 2d at 1135.
70. A copy of the "spain" was forwarded to me three years ago, with the inquiry, "Can they do
that?"
71. This might have been permissible under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000).
72. Universal Studios v. Reimerdes, I1l F.Supp. 2d 294, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations
omitted).
73. 87 F.Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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supported this contention. The court granted a preliminary injunction on the
ground that defendant's device neutralized an access control; the court did not
inquire into whether a game lawfully acquired in one region could be played in
another without infringing copyright. Both the "first sale" (or "exhaustion")
doctrine, 74 and the confinement of the performance right to public performances,
however, suggest that the copyright owner's exclusive rights do not extend to
determining the geographical zones in which members of the public may privately
view copies lawfully made.
Applying section 1201(a) to protect against
circumvention of access measures that limit those copies to playback devices
licensed for a given territory thus results in a scope of protection not otherwise
available under the copyright act.
But if region-coding is obnoxious, cannot much the same objection be made
regarding access measures that control pay-per-view and similar schemes based on
price discrimination? The answer may turn on the existence of evidence that
Congress sought to protect the latter business models, while similar evidence does
not appear to exist regarding the former. Moreover, the latter business models are
built on a quid pro quo: the extent of access allowed turns on the price the
consumer pays. Price discrimination does not appear to characterize region-coding;
the consumer is not offered world-wide access at one price, and geographically
restricted access at a different, lower, price. These responses do not, however,
contradict the basic observation that, by protecting against the circumvention of
access controls, without further requiring proof of a nexus between the
circumvention and infringement, Congress has permitted, indeed encouraged,
copyright owners to create and control markets for their works that the traditional
exclusive rights under copyright would not secure. Whether this is a good thing or
a bad thing may depend on whether, overall, more works become available to more
consumers, under a greater variety of terms, conditions and prices, than were
75
available without legally protected technological protection measures.
Accommodation of copyright exceptions: Even so, there is another trade-off
to consider. Is this flourishing of new owner-controlled copyright markets
compatible with the various exceptions that limit the reach of copyright law in a
variety of circumstances? Do we get more works for less money, but less freedom
to quote from, teach from, build on, study, criticize and even ridicule them? To
assess the impact on copyright exceptions of legal protection for technological
protection measures, we have first to distinguish section 1201's treatment of
circumvention of rights controls from that of access controls. With respect to
access controls, section 1201 reaches both the end-users who directly circumvent
those controls and the persons who manufacture, distribute and market devices
primarily designed or used to circumvent those controls. On the other hand, section
1201 includes several exceptions to these prohibitions. As construed by the courts,

74. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
75. For a general critique of arguments that price discrimination can justify the creation or
reinforcement of intellectual property rights, see Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price
Discrimination:Implicationsfor Contract, 73 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1367 (1998).
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do these adequately accommodate desirable, albeit unauthorized, uses of
copyrighted works?
With respect to rights controls, section 1201 does not reach end-users who
directly circumvent rights controls, or who employ devices to effect the
circumvention. Thus, an end-user who circumvents a copy control and then makes
a copy or communication that is permissible under the fair use doctrine or other
applicable exception is liable neither for a circumvention violation nor for
copyright infringement. An end-user who circumvents a copy control to make an
unexcused copy or communication to the public will not be liable for a
circumvention violation, but will be liable for copyright infringement. On the other
hand, the prohibition on trafficking in rights control circumvention devices may
make it difficult for many end-users to obtain and utilize the devices regardless of
the purpose to which they would put them. Does the prohibition on distribution of
devices primarily designed or used to circumvent rights controls therefore stifle
copyright exceptions and the beneficial uses those exceptions foster?
Exceptions to circumvention of access controls: The DMCA provides a
variety of exceptions, including for reverse engineering, encryption research and
security testing. 76 The section 1201(f) exception for reverse engineering 77 permits
the circumvention of access controls for the sole purpose of creating non-infringing
interoperable programs. In Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway,78 however, the

76.
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the "DigitalMillennium, " 23 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 137, 148-52 (1999), for a fuller description of these, and the other, exceptions to 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (2000).
77.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) provides:
(f)Reverse Engineering.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the
right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and that
have not previously been readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to the
extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop and employ
technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by
a technological measure, in order to enable th identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or
for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent that doing
so does not constitute infringement under this title.
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and the means permitted
under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the person referred to in paragraph (1) or
(2), as the case may be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and to the
extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law other
than this section.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "interoperability" means the ability of computer programs
to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has been
exchanged.

78.

334 F.Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), affid., 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
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defendants, having gained access by reverse engineering the plaintiffs control
program, made infringing copies of the plaintiffs work. Defendants broke the
access code of the Battle.net online videogame service in order to develop a
Battle.net "emulation site" that would allow owners of copies of the Blizzard
videogame to play their games online, without the. advertisements and use
restrictions imposed by the Battle.net site. Battle.net required users to enter an
authentication sequence that would permit the website to verify that the user's copy
of the game was authorized. Thus, Battle.net screened out unauthorized copies and
did not allow them access to the game site. Defendants' "bnetd" alternative site did
not require users to enter the authentication sequence; as a result, owners of
"counterfeit" as well as legitimate copies could join in a multiplayer game
environment that replicated the desirable aspects of the Battle.net experience. The
district court held that the output of the "bnetd" program infringed that of the
Battle.net program because there were "no differences between Battle.net and the
79
bnetd emulator from the standpoint of a user who is actually playing the game."
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding of infringement, albeit without additional
analysis.
It is not entirely clear that the defendant's use in that case in fact exceeded the
scope of the reverse engineering exception. Assuming the defendant had lawfully
obtained a copy of the Blizzard and/or Battlenet programs, it appears to have
accessed the program's code "for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those
elements of the (Battle.net) program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of
an independently created computer program (bnetd) with other programs (its users'
copies of Blizzard). '80 Defendant was entitled to do this "to the extent any such acts
of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title."81 The
decision does not demonstrate that the defendant's analysis was infringing; rather, the
results of the analysis may have produced a program too similar to the plaintiff's. On
the other hand, the exception would not make very much sense if it did not take into
account whether the program that results from accessing and studying the plaintiffs
code is infringing. The case law developing a fair use exception for reverse
engineering, for example, assesses whether the result of the reverse engineering is an
independent, non-infringing program (similar in functionality but not expression).8 2
Moreover, the court's decision is generally consistent with the rationale for protecting
access controls in the first place: to render unauthorized copies useless because the
access control will not permit the copies to be viewed or otherwise enjoyed. In this
case, the Battle.net authentication sequence rendered unauthorized copies of Blizzard
relatively useless because they would not be admitted to the online multiplayer site.
Defendant's bnetd site allowed those copies to be played, thus defeating the purpose
of the access control.

79.

334 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.

80.

Id. at 1184.

81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer
Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Copyright Office rulemaking: While the exceptions to section 1201(a) are
multiple, they are also very narrowly defined, and do not admit of expansive judicial
construction. 83 As a result, Congress instructed the Librarian of Congress, in
consultation with the Register of Copyrights, to conduct a rulemaking every three
years to identify particular classes of works whose users would be "adversely
affected by the prohibition... in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this
title" and to suspend the application of the prohibition on the act of access control
circumvention as to those works until the next rulemaking period.84 Each
rulemaking is de novo: a class identified in a prior rulemaking is not automatically
reinstated; the Copyright Office must determine whether a need for an exemption
still exists. It is important to recognize, however, that the prohibitions against
trafficking in access circumvention devices continue to apply. Two rulemakings
have now been conducted and the following classes of works declared:
"compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software
applications" (first and second rulemakings);
"literary works, including software and databases, protected by access control
mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage or
obsolescence" (first rulemaking);
"Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to
malfunction or damage and which are obsolete" (second rulemaking);
"Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have become
obsolete and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access"
(second rulemaking)
"Literary works distributed in e-book format when all existing e-book editions
of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities)
contain access controls that prevent the enabling of the e-book's read-aloud
function and that prevent the enabling of screen readers to render the text into a
'specialized format"' (second rulemaking).8 5
The characteristic most of these categories share is obsolescence or malfunction:
the work was made available in formats no longer generally in use or which are
defective, and circumvention is necessary to access the work. The lists of blocked
websites, or "Net Nanny," exemption is different in kind, for, rather than protecting
consumer interests regarding the ordinary use of defective or obsolete goods, it
promotes free speech interests. The problem arises from software filters designed,
for example, to protect children by blocking access to websites containing sex

83. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E) (2000).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C) (2000). For a fuller discussion, see Besek, Anti-Circumvention
Laws, supra note 26, 416-23.
85. Exemption to the Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556, 64561 (proposed Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 201); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,013-14 (Oct. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
201).
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and/or violence, hence the term "Net Nanny." Some of these filters may be overexuberant in their coverage, and may screen out websites that are neither
pornographic nor sadistic, but that may contain human anatomical references in
medical or other educational contexts. The blocking programs include lists of the
forbidden sites, but the list is encrypted. A third party seeking to determine
whether a site has been wrongly targeted for exclusion cannot find out who is on
the "black list" without decrypting the list. The Copyright Office was persuaded
that an exception to the access control prohibition was needed to correct this
problem.
As may be inferred from the specificity of the exceptions resulting from the
triennial rulemakings, these administrative proceedings do not present an
opportunity to devise sweeping exceptions in the name of free expression,
advancement of research or other salutary goals. In significant measure, this is
because Congress left the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office rather little
room to maneuver. The EU Information Society Directive's art. 12.1 instruction to
the Commission to examine and report on a triennial basis "whether acts which are
permitted by law are being adversely affected by the use of effective technological
measures" may produce broader accommodations than the Copyright Office has
been able to achieve in light if its far narrower statutory mandate. Another reason
for the parsimonious nature of the Copyright Office classes of exempted works
nonetheless bears emphasis: the Copyright Office also rejected a variety of more
broadly-phrased classes because those urging the broader classes failed to produce
significant evidence that users were now, or in the next three years would likely be,
"adversely affected by the prohibition.., in their ability to make noninfringing
uses" of access-protected works. The Copyright Office received many submissions
detailing fears of "digital lockup" (as well as many submissions deploring
copyright in general), but too little in the way of concrete demonstration that noninfringing uses were compromised.
Other authority for broader exemptions?: The statutory scheme similarly
constrains judicial authority to devise general exceptions to circumvention
prohibitions. The array of specific exceptions makes inference of a general
exception inappropriate. Moreover, the delegation to the Copyright Office to
designate circumventable classes of works suggests that Congress intended
administrative rather than judicial proceedings to make the scheme more responsive
to user needs not already specified in the statute. But, assuming Congress intended
to foreclose judges from engrafting a general fair use type exception onto section
1201, may Congress do so consistently with constitutional protections for the free
speech interests that section 1201 arguably frustrates? In the absence of fair use,
does the First Amendment require invalidating section 1201 as an undue burden on
protected speech?
Some litigants have asserted the unconstitutionality of the US Copyright Act's
anti-circumvention provisions.
They have contended that fair use is
constitutionally mandated and that section 1201 "eliminates fair use." As a result,
Congress would not have power to preclude fair use defenses to circumvention.
Alternatively, they have argued that section 1201 suppresses speech-the speech in
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this instance is the DVD access-circumvention program De-CSS-and therefore
violates the First Amendment.
86
Every court that has so far encountered these challenges has rejected them.
With regard to the First Amendment, courts have observed that computer programs
are a form of speech, but they are also functional. To the extent the government
regulates the software's functional aspects, the law is "content neutral" as to the
speech aspects. The law will not be considered to violate the First Amendment if
the regulation advances a legitimate government interest and is reasonably tailored
to achieve that purpose. Congress' interest was in promoting electronic commerce
in copyrighted works, and Congress could legitimately seek to achieve this
objective by making the distribution of circumvention devices unlawful.8 7
The fair-use assertions fared no better. First, courts expressed some skepticism
as to whether fair use was constitutionally required. Even granting that fair use
plays an important, First Amendment-friendly role in balancing the rights of
copyright owners against subsequent speakers, the courts have uniformly spurned
the "extravagant claim" that section 1201 "unconstitutionally 'eliminates fair
use."8 8 The courts have observed that unprotected copies in non-digital media
remained available for all the usual fair use purposes, including by means of analog
copying. Even copying from protected media, such as DVDs, might be rendered
more cumbersome, but it was not completely foreclosed. The courts emphasized
that "[flair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted
material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of
the original." 89 And "Defendant has cited no authority which guarantees a fair user
the right to the most technologically convenient90way to engage in fair use. The
existing authorities have rejected that argument."
The courts' rather abrupt treatment of the question probably reflects the contexts
in which the cases arose, as much as the merits of a claim of entitlement to
maximally convenient fair use. The cases have involved entrepreneurs and
intermediaries who distributed circumvention devices that were perceived to
facilitate piracy of DVDs and e-books. None of these intermediaries claimed to be
engaging in fair use of the circumvented works, nor did they show that their
customers in fact sought the devices primarily in order to engage in non-infringing
uses of the playable copies of DVDs that the devices enabled. Fair use in this
context seemed primarily pretextual. But the concerns about convenience are not
frivolous: at some point, particularly if analog or unprotected versions cease to be
readily available, "inconvenient" may look more like "impossible." Should such a
dismal future appear more imminent, it may well be appropriate to reconsider the
scope of the circumvention prohibitions. But we are a long way yet from that dire
outcome.
86. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Elcom, 203
F.Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
87. See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 453-58; Elcom, 203 F.Supp. 2d at 1127-37.
88. Corley, 273 F.3d at 458.
89. Id. at 459.
90. Elcom, 203 F.Supp. 2d at 1131.
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CONCLUSION
Section 1201 does represent a rebalancing of power between copyright owners
and users. But we should not immediately assume that any change in the prior state
of affairs is a bad thing. After all, which prior "balance" do we mean? The one in
which technology did not offer much potential for consumptive copying and
copyright owners controlled access by controlling communications to the public?
Or the one in which technology enabled widespread copying, but did not afford
adequate and reasonable means of preventing or charging for the copying? Or the
one in which technology permits massive copying, but also enables copyright
owners to be paid for it? Or one in which technology enables copyright owners to
prevent or frustrate copying? Taking the last pre-DMCA balance as somehow
normatively compelled ignores the reality that copyright "balances" are highly
contingent and contextual. The more useful question is, regardless of past
allocations of power, whether the new balance makes sense for authors, owners and
users.
As a recently published three-year study conducted by Columbia Law School's
Kemochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts concluded:
§ 1201 ...involves genuine tradeoffs: Congress made a judgment that technological
protection would foster innovation in new content delivery mechanisms in order to
provide consumers with a range of new options for experiencing copyrighted works,
recognizing that technological controls might diminish the convenience of noninfringing uses. So far, the balance that Congress struck appears justified. Section
1201 has provided substantial benefits to consumers by encouraging the development
of innovative new business models for delivering sound recordings, motion pictures,
books and other copyrighted works to consumers.
On the other hand, there is little evidence at this point that technological controls
are preventing privileged uses. Flexibility in the law, the realities of the digital
environment and market imperatives appear to be accommodating legitimate uses.
Most copyrighted works are available for fair uses, though not necessarily in a form
amenable to the most technologically advanced forms of copying, remanipulation and
retransmission. Such limitations, however, are at the heart of the new business
models that are emerging in the marketplace.
The reasons that DMCA critics offer for overhauling or replacing § 1201 are
essentially the same ones presented to Congress in opposition to the legislation when
it was under consideration. Congress took them into account in crafting § 1201.
Based on the track record so far, § 1201 appears to be performing largely as Congress
had envisioned and should not be overhauled or replaced. The benefits-more works
available to consumers at a variety of price and convenience points-are real, and the
costs have so far been manageable. It is important to continue to monitor § 1201's
effects and, where problems become apparent, develop specific, focused solutions. At
the present time, however, we should allow the new business models enabled by §
1201 the opportunity to continue to flourish. 91

I close on an optimistic note. This analysis has addressed the occasionally
competing concerns of copyright owners and of users. The word "copyright
91.

Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, supranote 26, at 512-13.

2005]

LEGAL PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES

37

owner" more often than not evokes a large, unloveable, multinational (or
American), corporate entrepreneur, in short, an Evil Troll. It is easy to deplore
technological protections if one thinks of them only in those apocalyptic terms.
But one might instead focus on the opportunities technological protections
extend to individual authors to disseminate their works and to condition further
copying or exploitation on remunerating the creators. Digital media, by making the
means of production and dissemination available to any computer-equipped author,
give authors a realistic opportunity to bring their works to the public without
having to put themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries. The technological
measures that reinforce legal control may enable and encourage authorial
entrepreneurship, because authors may be able to rely on these measures to secure
the distribution of and payment for their works, and new business models may
therefore emerge. Shifting control from publisher-trolls to authors not only
enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, it also may offer the public
an increased quantity and variety of works of authorship, as authors whom the
traditional intermediary-controlled distribution system may have excluded now or
soon may directly propose to the public (and be compensated for) their creations.

